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SIGNALING EFFICIENCY
OF OVERT V. COVERT SIGNALS
Zhemin (Jamie) Wang

INTRODUCTION
In the capital market, investors and creditors have _to ~ake critical
decisions based on anticipated performance of the firm, which will not occur
until many years in the future. To the extent that firms are unable lo
communicate their future cash now prospects to the capital market, lhe
resulting adverse-selection problem may cause significant soci~l _welfare losses
by, for example, inducing firms to forego investment opportunil1es lh_al _would
otherwise be profitable (Myers and Majluf, 1984 ). Therefore, 1l 1s in the
interest of all parties lo develop eflicienl signaling strategies that eliminate the
potential of inefliciency and social welfare losses (Herbig and Milewicz, 1996).
Signaling by firms lo the capital market has been studied extensively in the
literature (Herbig and Milewicz, 1996, Penno, 1997; Franke, 1987, Brennan
and Kraus, 1987). Two types of signaling mechanisms, overl signaling and
covert signaling, have been the basis of studies cited in the literature Overt
signaling refers lo the conscious communication of information by a firm-an
announcement lo the press, a disclosure in an annual report, reports to
analysts, or any public statements. Covert signaling occurs when no verbal
signals are given, when it is an action, such as a stock repurchase plan or
dividend policy, that must be evaluated and interpreted by the capital market
(John et al., 1984; Williams, 1988) Overt signaling can be made timely with
little or no cost. Covert signali ng, on the other hand, usually involves a high
level of expenses requi red for the action The literature generally examines
either the overt signaling or the covert signaling mechanisms and has
concluded that covert signaling, because of the very fact that il is expensive, is
believable whereas overt signali ng is not (Herbig and Milew1cz, 1996, Williams,
1988). Were a firm able to make credible claims about its future performance,
according lo the "cheap talk" model, il would have 111cenlive lo lie lo the
capital market since it would benefit from manipu lating the capital market's
perception about the firm 's future performance (Farrell and Gibbons, 1987 ).
This theory implies that knowing the above information, the capital market
will never believe any such cheap talk (overt signaling) and the firm will never
b: ab_le lo signal credibly about its future perfo rmances through overt
s1gnalmg.
While the "cheap talk" model is intuitively appealing, empirical evidence
suggests that overt signals do contain information content (Frost, 1997; Han et
al., 198~; Han and :Vild, 1991). This study proposes that both signaling
mechanisms are required for efficient s ignaling in the capital market. It a rgues
th at fir_ms prefer overt signaling to covert s ignaling because the fo rmer can be
made timely with little cost. Such preference provides an incen tive for honest
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ov~rl signa_ling ~ecause the_ capital mark~t can punish dishonest overt signaling
swiftly by ignoring overt signals, therefore, the firm is forced to rely on mor
expensive covert signaling mechanisms lo communicate lo the capital marke:
Specifically, a model of a non-cooperat1velv supported equilibrium is presented.
Al equ_ilibrium, the capital market correctly anl1c1pales lhal firms will give
overt signals honestly and reacts to the owrt signals as if lhey truthfully renect
private management information Accord mg lo the model, despite the fact that
the signaling firm will never want lo defect from the equilibrium, for some
d1stribut1ons of the alternative mformal10n, the signaling firm and the capital
market will enter a non-cooperative episode during which the firm can
communicate lo the capital market onl.'- through costly covert signaling such as
dividend policy or stock repurchase plans This conclusion seems consistent
with the observation lhal companies do use both signaling mechanisms (Frost,
1997, Herbig and Milew1cz, 1996 )
In the past decade, demand from the financial commu nity for more
disclosure of non financial and forward-looking informauon has increased ( oil
and Weygandt, 1997). The SEC and other standard seltmg bodies, however, are
still debating the cred1b1lity of such disclosures (Jenkins, 1994; Gaeremynck,
1997) The conclusion of lh1s research seems to suggest that the SEC and other
standard setting bodies should encourage companies to make more voluntary
disclosures (overt signaling) of nonfinancial and forward-lookmg mformatton
to sallsfv the information need of financial statement users
The rest of this study 1s organized as follows. First is a review of the
literature, then the model of analvs1s that shows that under certain
assumptions, a cooperative result can be achieved in the non-cooperatl\'e
disclosure game 1s presented, finall.v. the last section of the paper presents a
bnef summary and conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The standard finance model of optimal investment financing dividend
dec1s1ons for the firm (as s ummarized m Fama and Miller (1972 ) which, m turn,
builds on the earlter work of Miller and Mod1glian1 (1961 )) generally assumes
that outside investors and inside managers have the same 111format1on about
the firm 's current ea rnmgs and future opportun1l1es When this assumption 15
replaced by the more plausible assumption that managers know more than
outsiders about the firm's current and future cash flow prospects, Myers and
Majluf (1984 ) demonstrated that to the extent that firms are unable_ to
communicate their future cash flow prospects to investors, the resulting
adverse-selection problem may cause sign ificant social welfare loss~s by
inducing firms to forego investment opportunities that would otherwise_be
profitable. This conclusion has led to a number of research studies ~xamining
the possibility of signaling throu gh appropriate financing strategie~. Two
concepts of s ignaling have been studied in the literature, the costly-s'.gnal'.ng
(covert signaling) a nd the costless-signaling (overt signaling). Covert signahng
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with the two signaling equ1libr1a are reviewed separatelv

Covert Signaling Equilibria
Bhattacharya (1979) developed a model in which cash d1ndends functioned
as a coverl signal of expected cash flows of a firm in an imperfect-inf~rmat10~
lt'
In Bhaltacharya's setting, dividends provide the mechamsm for a
se mg. .
1·
·1·b .
onl v because of the d1ss1pal1ve costs associated
covert s1gna mg equi 1 num
h
h
th t t
with dividend payments, 1 e., dividends arc taxed al a rate h1g e r l an a ,a.
which capital gains a rc taxed. Bhattacharya's model assumes that outs1de~s
assess the value of the firm using only the 10format10n prov1d~d by the firm :;
announced dividends. Another rcstn ction of Bhattacharva s model 1:; the
assumption about investment uncertainty Bhattacharya conce_ntrated _on the
special case m which a new proJect's incremental cash flow X 1s d1su 1butcd
unifor mly O\'er 10,tl The density function for X 1s g t\ Cn b~
f(Xl = 0
f(Xl = 1 t
f(Xl = 0

1f X < 0
1f O < X < t
1f X > l

It 1s 1mphc1tly assumed that lh1s parametric form of the d1stnbuuon of
incremental cash flow 1s known to both insiders and outsiders H owever, onlv
insiders know the value of the parameter t
The d1 suncuon between
uncerlamtv aboul th e enti re den s1tv function f X l and unccrtaint;, about the
single par~meler t is an important c;nc--by assummg that outsiders have prior
knowledge of the fo rm er and s1mpl) do not knO\\ the latte r, the model
s1g01!icantly constrams the exten t of investment unccrtamty
Williams (1988) also exammcd covert signaling equ1libr1um usmg
dividends. He demonstrated that, al equil1bnum, corporate 111s1ders with more
valuable private mformat1on optimally d1s tnbule larger d1\'1dcnds and receive
higher prices fo r them stock whenever the demand fo r cash bv both the firm
and its current stockholders exceeds its mtcrnal supply of ·ca s h Because
dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by other means, curre nt
stockholders caplure, 111 equiltbnum, all economic renls net of d1ssipat1ve
signaling cosls. The major argument of t he paper 1s that when ra1s10g funds
for mvestmenl, a firm musl eilhe r issue new s hares or re tire fewe r outs tanding
shares, both actions which would dilute t he fractional owne rs hip of current
shareholders. Reducing this dilutio n is clearly m ore valuable to curren t
~lockholders when inside information is more favorable. Consequently,
insiders, acting in the interes ts of t heir cu rrent s tockholders, may dis tribu te a
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taxable dividend if outsiders recognize this relationship, bid up t he stock price,
and, thereby, reduce current stockholders' dilution. In equilibrium, insiders
control dividends optimally, while outsiders pay the correct price fo r t he firm's
stock. Other related studies include Miller and Rock (1985) and J ohn et al.
(1984), among others.

Overt Signaling Equilibria
A common featu re of the studies reviewed previously is that the resulting
covert signaling equilibrium involves either dissi pative cost (e.g.,
Bhattacharya, 1979) or welfare losses (e.g., Miller and Rock, 1985). In response
to the criticism of the costly covert signaling equilibrium, several research
studies addressed the issue of over t s1gnahng equilibria (e.g., Herbig and
Milewicz, 1996; Brennan and Kraus, 1987; Franke, 1987; and Constantinides,
1986). Brennan and Kraus (1987 ) derived necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of costless overt signaling equilibrium using appropriate
financing strategies. The general conclusion of Brennan and Kraus is that in
order to have a fully-revealing equilibrium, the set of available financing
strategies and the family of density functions of firm returns must be strongly
K-compatible. K-compatibility requires that for each family of probability
density functions of risk-adjusted firm returns, a unique worst-case financing
strategy exists. This K-compat1bility condition 1s so restrictive that it
essentially precludes most practical situations.
The idea of overt signaling by possessors of s uperior information has been
studied by a number of economists in a variety of institutional settings, and the
results are mixed. For example, Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) suggest
that the possessor of information about a product or asset (e g., a salesperson,
a manager, etc.) would be obligated to follow a policy of full disclosure. These
authors argue that when a salesperson withholds information, buyers'
suspicions about the quality of the product are so great that they discount its
quality to the point that the sales person 1s always better served to disclose what
he/she knows. In effect, the threshold level of disclosure collapses to the least
favorable possible information the salesperson can possess. Howeve r, analysis
under slightly different assumptions concluded that managements do exercise
discretion in the disclosure of information (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). Grossman
and Milgrom's conclusion was also questioned by the empi rical evidence (Healy,
1985; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1989; DeAngelo, 1988).
Of particular relevance to this study is the "cheap talk" model. The
concept of "cheap talk" was introduced m an abstract setting by Crawford and
Sobel (1982), and was studied in various contexts by Farrell and Gibbons
~1987), Matthews (1987), and Stein (1989). The "cheap talk" model addresses,
m essence, the issue of costless information transfer (overt signaling). It differs
from information transfer via costly covert signaling mechanisms such as
dividend policy or stock repurchase in that it is free-communication can be
m~d_e al no cost (Miller a nd Rock, 1985; John el a l., 1984; Dann, 198l;
Williams, 1988). The cheap talk literature concludes that the credibility of
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overt signaling is questionable because, were the company able to make
credible claims, it would have an incentive to lie to the market since it would
benefit from manipulating the market perception about the company's futu re
cash flow prospects. This implies that knowing the above, the capital market
will never be lieve any such cheap talk (over t s ignaling) and the company will
never be able to communicate any information about its future cash flow
prospects through overt signaling. In su mmary, the existing literature on overt
signaling generally suggests a lack of e ffi ciency of this s ignaling mechanism.
THE MODEL
As the "efficienl market hypothesis" gains more widespread acceptance,
the notion of using overt signaling mechanisms s uch as corporate voluntary
disclosures as a means of disclosing management inside information is
increasingly embraced by the financial community (Thompson, 1997). While
this notion of signaling seems to appeal to the investing community, significant
controve rsies exist regarding the credibility of this signaling mechanism. As
indicated in the previous rev iew, the signaling literature has generally
questioned t he credibility of overt signaling, such as managemenl voluntary
disclosures. The emptncal evidence is a lso mixed (Han et al., 1989; Han and
Wild, 1991; Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1988). In light of t he controversies
regarding credibility of overt s ignaling, it is certainly timely to examine the
issue of signal mg efficie ncy.
The review of literature also indicates that the existi ng signaling literature
generally examines either the covert signaling or overt signaling in a oneperiod static selling. This study extends the literature in two major ways.
First, it exam mes a s ignaling equ ilib rium that requires the use of both overt
and covert signaling mechanisms. Second, this study addresses the signaling
equi librium usmg dynamic programming in a multi-period setting. The setting
of this study 1s clearly more realistic because both signaling mechanisms are
available lo all companies and business operations a re "going concerns." In
addition, this study also extends the existing literature by allowing ex post
uncertainty of signaling quality of overt signals. The assumption of ex post
uncertainty is a n important extension lo the literature because, in reality, t he
capital market will never be ab le to veri fy with certainty whether a firm 's overt
signals truthfully re flect a ll management private information even ex post.
Instead, the capital ma rket can o nly infe r the fi rm 's signaling quality indirectly
by the ful fi llment history of prior overt signals. That is, the market observes
the realized return and compa res it with the expected return lo infer overt
signaling quality. Comparison between realized returns a nd expected returns
based on t he over t signals can be used by the capital market to measure overt
signaling quality because it reflects a lternative information about t he firms
that eithe r confirms or disconfirms the in formation contained in the overt
signals. H owever, even if both the ma rket a nd the signaling firms form rational
expectations about t he future, comparison betwee n realized ret urns and
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expected returns is only a noisy measure of signaling quality because returns
are a function of many other variables, not all of which are under management
control, nor are observable to the capital market. In other words, t he securities
market can not differentiate signaling quality with certain ty upon observing
alternative information because disconfirming information does not
necessarily imply dishonest overt signaling by th e management. Consequently,
uncertainty on signaling quality exists even ex post.
A distinctive feature of the model presented in th is study is that both overt
signaling and covert signaling mechanisms a re necessary to signal efficiently.
Specifically, the capital market will react cooperatively with respect to overt
signaling as long as the fulfillment history of prior overt signals is satisfactory
to the market (i.e., realized return on investment decisions based on prior
overt signals at t-1 is at the expected level). But the market will revert for a
while to a non-cooperative behavior when the realized ret urn falls. During the
non-cooperative period, the market severely discounts or completely ignores
the overt signaling by the firm , which means that the company wi ll have to rely
exclusively on costly covert signaling mechanisms such as stock repurchase
plans to communicate information to the capital market. Thus, the threat by
the capital market to ignore costless overt signals and, therefore, force the
company to rely on costly covert signaling mechanisms acts as an incentive for
truthful overt signaling by the signaling company. The signaling firms and the
capital market agree on a trigger-level of return t o which the market compares
the realized return in deciding its stra tegy to react Lo the curre nt overt signals.
In addition, such comparison is also observable to the signaling firms that, in
turn, use such information to determine their signaling s trategies. Whenever
the realized return falls below the trigger-level while they have been acting
cooperatively, the capital market will revert to a non-cooperative behavior by
ignoring overt signals for some fixed amount of time before resuming
cooperative behavior.
If at a given time, when the firm 1s su pposed to be cooperative with the
capital market (i.e., the firm 's management is s upposed to signal truthfully
through overt signaling mechanisms such as a press re lease about the firm 's
future cash now pros pects and the capital market is s upposed to believe it), if
the firm overstates its future cash now prospects, its share value at that time
will increase. However, by increasing the probability that the return on
investments based on this information will fall below the trigger-level, the
signaling firm incurs a risk that the capital ma rket will e nte r a punishing
episode during which the firm will have to expend economic resources to rely
on costly covert signaling to communicate with the capital market. To the
extent that real economic resources are sacrificed in signaling, the firm 's share
price will be lowered. In addition, the firm 's inability to communicate timely
and the resulting adverse-selection by the capital market will further depress
the fi r m's share price. For high signaling quality to be the signaling fir m's non·
cooperatively optimal action, the marginal expected loss in futu re share price
decline from possibly triggering the market punishment must exactly balance
the margi nal gain from fooling i,he capiLal market by giving fal se signals such
as overstating its future cash now pros pects.
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The following assumptions a re made about the economy, the capital
market, and the signaling firm. First, the macro economic condition, the
capital market, and the s ignaling firm are assumed to be stab le (i.e., the
environment is stationary and time separable). Second, while the past and
present overt signaling quality is the signaling firm's private knowledge (i.e.,
only t he firm's management knows whether it has truthfully signaled all its
private information to the capital market), the expected and realized returns of
the investment, as well as the economic environment within which the firm
operates, is observable by both parties. Finally, the fu lfillment history of prior
overt signals, based on which the capital market assesses the signaling quality
of the firm 's overt signals, is only imperfectly correlated with the firm 's
signaling quality. In other words, the return is s ubject to some factors that
cannot be accurately identified in judging t he s ignaling quality. The first
assu mption is required in order to assume that both the signaling firm and the
capital market have rational expectations-an assumption that underlies the
use of Nash equilibrium. The second assumption is necessary because the
rea lization of a common variable must be observed in order to decide for both
the capital market and the signaling firm whether the game is in a cooperati ve
or non-cooperative period. Finally, the th ird assumption rules out the case
whe re only cooperative behavior can occur.
Specifically, t he signaling firm 's return function is n,(e,"q..) (n, is the firm 's
return from signaling a future performance level e,, through overt signaling
and being perceived by t he market as of quality q,.). q,_, is a function of
unexpected returns, r,." which, in t urn , is a function of t he information
contained in the overt signals, e," and alternative information, I,." i.e., r,. = I,
r(e,). T he alternative information I,, is a random variable distributed i.i.d. with
cumulative density function F having a continuous density f. Int uitively, the
alternative information comes to the capital market in a ra ndom manner which
either confirms or disconfirms the overt signals. However, the alternative
information cannot reveal signaling quality with certainty because the market
cannot differentiate with certainty the controllable (or normal) events from the
uncontrollable (o r unpredictable) events. The signaling firm is assumed to be
risk neutral and maximize the following function :
( 1)

Max E(L P'(e11, q,,)
IO

•

•

where J3 is the discount rate. The signaling firm 's strategy is:
S

= (s

0,

(2)

s,, ... )

where s 0 is the initial overt signaling quality and st determines the signaling
quality at t for t>O as a function of t he ma rket perception of the fi rm's past
signaling qual ity by s,=(q0 , •• • ,q,,) = e,. A ash equilibrium strategy satisfies
E, (

EP'Il,[S,,,(q (r
1-0

1

), ••• ,q,(r,)),
1

q,_,(r,)]) s Es· (

E
P'Il,[S,.:(qi{r
,.o

1), ••• ,q,(r,)),
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(3 )

for all feasible s.
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Now, one must consider the signaling quality in a Nash eq ·1·b · •
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1gna mg
mn s stocks Mana~ement will continue to do so until the unexpected return
(the dev1at1on of reahzed return on investme nt from the expected return ha ed
on the firm's overt signal) fa lls below a trigger-level retu rn, r . Then, :he
market will punish the signaling firm fo r a fixed number of periods, T-1, during
which the firm's stock pnce 1s depressed. The s ignaling firm will have to rely
on costly covert signaling mechanisms (such as dividend policy or stock
repurchase plans) to communicate to the capital market du ring this period. At
the conclusion of the episode (T periods after r< r ) the signaling firm and the
market will resume cooperative behavior a nd will continue to do so until the
next timer< r

The s ignaling firm 's strategy is defined by e=e11 if t is a cooperative period
and e=e, 1f t 1s a non-cooperative period (tis a cooperative period if (a) t=O, or
b) t-1 was cooperative and r
r , or (c) t - Twas normal and r.:::. tis a noncooperative period otherwise). The signa ling firm faces a two-state T-stage
dvnam1c programming problem. Its optimal policy is to signal e, in cooperative
p~riods and e, in non-cooperative periods. rr 11 and rrL ar~ the si_gnali_ng firm:s
expected return of signal mg e 11 and e 1 , r espectively, and n2 1s the signaling fi_rm s
expected return of signaling e, when 1t is s upposed to s i_g nal ~11• Smee_durmg a
cooperative period, the fi rm 1s able to credibly communicate mformat10n about
its future cash flows through overt s ignaling, overstating its future cash flow
potenual would increase its return in that period. It is assumed that nL < 1111<n,.
The expected discounted present value of the signaling firm under the optimal
s ignaling strategy, V(e2 ) satisfies the fo llowing condition.

.r;

V(e,)

(4)

.
t h -c T he first term on the
wher e F(r de,)) is the probability th at Ir(e,J_is 1ess adnt, . . ale The second
.
1
h 1·t is s uppose o s ign II·
.
right 1s the r eturn from signa mg e w en
r Ii times the probability
term is the d1scou_nted pres~nt ~alue of t_he ds~gn;h1;fh/;;term is the discounted
that e does not trigger a revers1onary ep1so . .
period is triggered bye,.
P resent value of the signaling fi~m when a revebrs1on~tten as
. .
.m E qua t 1o n 3 can now e rewn
The ash equihbnum
(5)

F.0.C.
(6)
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S peci Ii ca II y,

(7)
Equation 7 states that the marginal return to the signaling firm from
overstating its performance potential in cooperative periods must be offset
exactly by the marginal mcrease in risk of triggering a non-cooperative episode.
It is evident that the signaling firm will never defect from the equilibrium
signaling quality and overt signaling can efficiently disclose management
private information about future cash nows. It is also evident that costly covert
signaling by the firms and adverse market reaction are also necessary
conditions of the equilibrium requirement. In addition, the frequency of
reversion from cooperative states is given by F ( r r(ez)). This conclusion seems
consistent with the observation that both costly covert signaling and costless
overt signaling mechanisms are used by companies (Herbig and Milewicz,
1996).
The previous discussion suggests that managers can credibly communicate
their private knowledge, such as forward-looking information, th rough overt
signaling even though 1t is costless. This conclusion is also supported by the
empirical evidence documented in previous studies that overt signals such as
management voluntary disclos ure contains information content (see Han et al.,
1989, Han and Wild, 1991) In light of the ongoing debate regarding the
des1rab1hty of more voluntary disclos ure, this s tudy's conclusion seems to
suggest that the EC and other financial reporting standard setting bodies
should encourage more voluntary di sclosures of nonfinancial and fo rwardlookmg mformat1on to sat1s(v the growing mformation needs of investors and
creditors

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIO
The author of this study addressed the issue of signalmg efficiency under
the assumption that the quality of overt signals by the firm's management is
never directly observable even ex post A model of a non-cooperatively
supported equ1hbnum was presented Al equilibrium, the capital market
co rrectly anticipates that companies will signal honestly through overt
signalin g and reacts to the overt sig nal s as if they truthfully renect
management private information According to the model, despite the fact that
the s igna ling firm would never want to defect from the equilibrium, for some
d1stribut.1ons of the alternative information, the signaling firm and the capital
market enter a non-cooperative episode, during wh ich the company will have
to rely o n costly covert signaling mechanisms to communicate information to
the capital market. The study of the model extended the literature in that it
presented an efficient signaling equilibrium through the use of both overt a nd
covert signaling mechanisms. The fi ndings s uggest that the SEC a nd other
standard setting bodies should encourage more managemen t vo lu nta ry
Southern Business Reuu•w
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disclosures of nonfinancia l and forward-looking information to meet the
growing information needs of in vestors and creditors.
T he analytical results of t his study are based on certain assumptions about
market and management behaviors. S pecifically, the study assumes rational
behavior on the firms and the market. While the rationality assumption is
widely used in the economic and fi nance literature, several research studies
seem to suggest t hat both fi rms and the market may not always behave
rat ionally (DeBond t and Thaler, 1985; 1987). In addition, while it has been
suggested that the self-pricing mecha nism generally holds in t he capital market
setti ng, furt her research stud ies a re necessary to confirm t his claim.
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